Chapter III

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POWERS OF ACTION

SENSITIVE APPETITE

"By powers of action," says Alfarabi, "are meant those powers which have action or movement for their object, and they are all grouped under the name of 'appetite.'" A general law rules our appetitive powers: "Nil volitum quin fuerit praecognitum." Appetite follows knowledge. For, appetite can never operate unless something is known and presented to it. Appetite may be moved either by the sense or by the intellect. If the appetite is moved by the sense, it becomes sensitive appetite. This is simply a tendency to good perceived by the senses.

Now, the sensitive appetite is divided into two powers, the concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite. Concupiscible appetite (shahuaniat) is a power by which the animal is led to seek what is useful to it, and to shun what is harmful. Irascible appetite (Gadibat) is a power by which the animal is aroused to acquire a good that is difficult to attain, and to remove any evil that would prevent its attainment. By his concupiscible appetite a dog seeks proper food and avoids what is injurious; by his irascible appetite he is angered and attacks the animal that tries to deprive him of his food.

The manifestations of the concupiscible appetite are called concupiscible passions, and those of the irascible appetite are called irascible passions.

Alfarabi characterizes the nature of the sensitive appetite by saying that

It is accompanied by a physical, bodily change. Thus, for instance, when one is aroused by a great desire to see something, he looks up and stares at the thing. The

p. 46

looking up and the staring represent the bodily change. 107

INTELLECTIVE APPETITE

If the appetite is moved by the intellect, it becomes intellective appetite, or will, and through it man attains his perfection and happiness. Of this Alfarabi says:

The will is not to be confused with freedom (the power of choice). Freedom can choose only what is possible, while the will can choose also the impossible. The latter is well exemplified in a man who does not will to die. Therefore, the will is more general than freedom, and for this reason all freedom is will, but not all will is freedom. 108

Footnotes

37:89 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit., pp. 147-152. See also Political Regime, op. cit., p. 47-51; The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit., n. 20, p. 74.

38:90 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit., p. 149; see also: Alfarabi, Political Regime, op. cit., pp. 47-51.

38:91 St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. Part I, Third No. (QQ. LXXV-CXIX)-Q. LXXVIII, Art. 3, p. 80. Tr. by the English Dominican Fathers.

39:92 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Third No. Q. LXXVIII, Art. 4, p. 85.

40:93 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit., p. 152.

40:94 Alfarabi, The Intellect and the Intelligible, in Collection, op. cit. n. 3, p. 47.

41:95 Albertus Magnus, An. post. I,. 1, 3.

41:96 D Alfarabi, The Intellect and the Intelligible, in Collection, op, cit. n. 1, pp. 45-46.

41:97 Alfarabi, Ibid. op. cit. n. 2, p. 47.

42:98 Alfarabi, Ibid. op. cit. n. 3, p. 47.

42:99 Alfarabi, Ibid. op. cit. n. 4, pp. 47-48.

42:100 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica. Part I, Third No. (QQ. LXXV-CXIX),-Q. LXXIX, Art. 2, p. 92.

43:101 Alfarabi, The Intellect and the Intelligible, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 49-54.

43:102 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Third No., Q. LXXIX, Art. 3, p. 94.

43:103 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Third No., Q. LXXIX, Art. 4, ad. 4, p. 98.

43:104 Alfarabi, The Intellect and the Intelligible, op. cit., n. 6, pp. 54-56.

43:106 With regard to the acquired intellect, see Albertus Magnus, Summa Theol., parag. II, Tract. XIII, Quaest. LXXVIII, Membr. 3.

44:105 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Third Number, Q. LXXXV, Art. 1, ad. 4, p. 183.

46:107 Alfarabi, Political Regime, op. cit., p. 65. See also pp. 50-51.

46:108 Alfarabi, A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions, in Collection, op. cit., n. 31, pp. 107-108.