Part II. Theoretical Philosophy

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METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY

The Theodicy of Alfarabi, which considers God in Himself, does not differ much from the Christian both in the arguments proving God's existence, as well as in the exposition of the various attributes which constitute His nature. There are, undoubtedly, certain flaws here and there on some non-essential points, but as a whole I can say that one who reads his Theodicy gets the impression of reading an essay written by a Christian Father. In this section we shall deal at length, not only with the arguments by which Alfarabi proves God's existence, but also with each of the attributes of God as he considers them, in order to bring out the perfect similarity that exists between Christian Theodicy and the Theodicy of Alfarabi.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

One of the preliminary questions which confronted Alfarabi was whether or not God is knowable. On this question he could not make up his mind, and consequently, he was hesitant to give a definite answer. Perhaps his hesitancy arose from his failure to distinguish between what is simply self-evident and that which is self-evident to us. In fact, he says:

It is very difficult to know what God is because of the limitation of our intellect and its union with matter. Just as light is the principle by which colors become visible, in like manner it would seem logical to say that a perfect light should produce a perfect vision. Instead, the very opposite occurs. A perfect light dazzles the vision. The same is true of God. The imperfect knowledge we have of God is due to the fact that He is infinitely perfect. That explains why His infinitely perfect being bewilders our mind. But if we could strip our nature of all that we call 'matter; then certainly our knowledge of His being would be quite perfect. 39

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In another place he says:

God is knowable and unknowable, evident and hidden, and the best knowledge of Him is to know that He is something the human mind cannot thoroughly understand. 40

A glance, however, into Alfarabi's later teaching leads us to the conclusion that he must have implicitly admitted the proposition, "God is", to be self-evident in itself, because he states repeatedly that God's essence is His existence, thus identifying the predicate with the subject. But since our mind is unable to understand the selfsame thing of both these terms, the implication is that Alfarabi must have come to the tacit conclusion that this proposition, "God is", is self-evident in itself, although not to us, and what is not evident to us can be demonstrated. 41 According to him, the knowledge of God is the object of philosophy, and the duty of man is to rise, as far as is humanly possible, up to the likeness of God. 42

PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

The arguments brought forth by Alfarabi to prove that there is a God, are three. These will be placed side by side with those of St. Thomas in order to aid the reader in comparing them. He will thus see the great similarity between them.

PROOFS ADDUCED BY ALFARABI

1. The Proof of Motion.

In this world there are things which are moved. Now, every object which is moved receives its motion from a mover. If the mover is itself moved, there must be another mover moving it, and after that still another and so on. But it is impossible to go onto infinity in the series of movers

PROOFS ADDUCED BY ST. THOMAS

It is certain and evident to our senses that in the world some things are in motion. Now, what-ever is in motion is put in motion by another ... If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity. Therefore,



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and things moved. Therefore, there must be an immovable mover, and this is God. 43

it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. 44



2. Proof of Efficient Cause.







In contemplating the changeable world, one sees that it is composed of beings which have a cause, and this cause, in turn, is the cause of another. Now, in the series of efficient causes it is not possible to proceed to infinity. For, if A were the cause of B, B of C, C of D, and so on, here A would be the cause of it-self, which is not admissible. Therefore, outside the series of efficient causes, there must be an uncaused efficient cause, and this is God. 45

In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself ... Now, in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. 46





Another form of the same proof:







Transition from not-being to being demands an actual cause. This cause either has its essence identical with its existence or not. If it does, then being is uncaused. If it does not, then existence must be from another, and that from another, and so on until we arrive at a First Cause, whose essence differs in no way from its existence. 47





3. Proof of Contingence.







The third proof is based on the principle that all change must

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to



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have a cause. To this effect Alfarabi makes a distinction between a necessary being and a contingent being. "Contingent beings," he says, "have had a beginning. Now, that which begins to exist must owe its existence to the action of a cause. This cause, in turn, either is or is not contingent. If it is contingent, it also must have received its existence by the action of another cause, and so on. But a series of contingent beings which would produce one another cannot proceed to infinity or move in a circle. Therefore, the series of causes and effects must arrive at a cause that holds its existence from itself, and this is the first cause (ens primum)." 48

be ... But it is impossible for these always to exist ... Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something, the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary being either has its necessity caused by another or not. Now, it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another. Therefore, we can-not but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. 49



The different arguments brought forth by Alfarabi to prove God's existence are really so many statements of one and the same argument which is commonly called the "cosmological" argument. This argument derives its validity from the principle of causality. And if the principle of causality is validly used by the scientists to explain the phenomena of physics, likewise it must be regarded as validly employed by the philosopher to explain the universe. Hence, the cosmological argument is valid because the principle of causality is valid.

The proof of an immovable mover by Aristotle, which leads to the conclusion that God is a designer and not a creator, was improved and corrected by Alfarabi nearly three hundred years before St. Thomas was born. Starting out from the Aristotelian idea of change, Alfarabi was able to arrive at an Ens Primum to whom that change is due, while He Himself does not change, because He is pure act.

The proofs of causality and contingence as given by St. Thomas are merely a repetition of Alfarabi's proofs. This is said,

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not because of any bias against St. Thomas, but rather because this is evident to anyone after studying the works of both Alfarabi and of St. Thomas.

The main idea running through all the proofs of Alfarabi is being. That which begins to exist implies a self-existent being. A finite and contingent being, that is, a being which has not given itself existence, implies a Being that holds its existence from itself. A being which begins to exist must have a cause for its existence.

An analysis of the proofs adduced by Alfarabi shows how he was able to arrive at their formulation. In each of his three proofs he starts out from a fact, applies a principle, and arrives at the conclusion. The fact is change, caused being and contingence. The principle is: that which is moved, is moved by another; the effect implies a cause; the contingent implies the necessary. The conclusion is that God exists.

HOW MAN ACQUIRES KNOWLEDGE OF GOD'S NATURE AND OF HIS ATTRIBUTES

Since man knows only what he finds out by his own senses and intelligence, it follows that he has no other way of knowing the divine nature except by observation. And observing the visible world, he perceives certain perfections and imperfections in it. To the first class belong such perfections as being, life, intelligence, truth, goodness and so on, which of themselves con-note perfection. To the second class belong all imperfections as non-being, non-living, non-intelligence, which necessarily con-note imperfection. While it cannot be said that God is non-living, non-intelligent, it can be said that He is infinitely good, intelligent and wise. While imperfections are removed from God, perfections can be attributed to Him eminently, namely, whatever positive being they express belongs to God as their cause in a much higher sense and in a more excellent way than to the creatures in which they exist. Another way of saying this is: given an infinite cause and finite effects, whatever pure perfection is discovered in the effects must first exist in the cause [Via Affirmationis], and at the same time whatever imperfection

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is discovered in the effects must be excluded from the cause [Via Remotions]. Alfarabi agrees with the foregoing explanation, saying that

We can have some knowledge of the nature of God by means of a two-fold process: first, by exclusion [Via Remotionis], by which we remove from God whatever implies defect, as limitation, dependence, mutability; and second, by pre-eminence [Via Eminentiae], by which we attribute to God in an infinite degree all perfections, such as goodness, wisdom, etc. 50

Concerning the method to be followed in determining God's nature, St. Thomas says exactly the same thing in the following words:

We have some knowledge thereof (divine essence) by knowing what it is not: and we shall approach all the nearer to the knowledge thereof according as we shall be enabled to remove by our intellect a greater number of things therefrom. 51

In another place St. Thomas says: "Quaelibet creatura potest in Deum venire tribus modis, scilicet, per causalitatem, remotionem, eminentiam." 52

The following are the attributes of God as considered by Alfarabi and St. Thomas.

(A) Process of Exclusion

ATTRIBUTES CONSIDERED BY ST. THOMAS

ATTRIBUTES CONSIDERED BY ALFARABI

SIMPLICITY OF GOD

God is simple because He is free from every kind of composition, physical or metaphysical.

There is no composition in God. For, in every composite thing there must needs be act and potentiality...

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[paragraph continues] Physical composition may be either substantial or accidental. It is substantial if the composite substance consists of body and soul, of matter and form. Now, an infinite being cannot be a substantial composite of matter and form, because this would mean that God results from the union of finite parts which would exist before Him in time, and therefore be the cause of His being. Nor can an accidental composition be attributed to the infinite, because this would imply a capacity for an increase in perfection, which the very notion of the infinite excludes. Therefore, there is not and cannot be any physical composition. 53

[paragraph continues] But in God there is no potentiality. Therefore, in Him there is no composition ... Every composite is subsequent to its components. Therefore, the first being, namely God, has no component parts. 54





Neither can there be that kind of composition known as metaphysical, which results from the union of two different concepts so referred to the same real thing that neither one by itself signifies the whole reality as meant by their union. Thus, every contingent being is a metaphysical composite of essence and existence. Essence, as such, in reference to a contingent being, implies its conceivableness or. possibility, and abstracts from actual existence; while existence, as such, must be added to essence before we can speak of the being as actual. But the composite of essence and existence in a contingent being can-not be applied to the self-existent or infinite being in whom essence and existence are one. Therefore, there is no composition of essence and existence in God. 55

Existence denotes a kind of actuality ... Now everything to which an act is becoming, and which is distinct from that act, is related thereto as potentiality to act ... Accordingly if the divine essence is distinct from its existence, it follows that His essence and existence are mutually related as potentiality and act. Now it has been proved that in God there is nothing of potentiality, and that He is pure act. Therefore God's essence is not distinct from His existence. 56



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Nor can the composition of genus and difference, implied in the definition of man as a rational animal, be attributed to Him. For, God cannot be classified or defined, as contingent beings can. The reason is because there is not a single aspect in which He is perfectly similar to the finite, and consequently no genus in which He can be included. 57

Wherefore it is likewise evident that God cannot be defined: since every definition is composed of genus and difference. 58





INFINITY OF GOD

ALFARABI

The uncaused being is infinite. For, if He were not, He would be limited, and therefore, caused, since the limit of a thing is the cause of it. But God is uncaused. Hence, it follows that the first being is infinite. 59

ST. THOMAS

Being itself, considered absolutely, is infinite ... Hence if we take a thing with finite being, this being must be limited by some other thing which is in some way the cause of that being. Now there can be no cause of God's being, since He is necessary of Himself. Therefore He has infinite being, and Himself is infinite. 60





IMMUTABILITY OF GOD

God as the first cause is pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, and for this reason He is not subject to any change. 61

It is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. 62



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UNITY OF GOD

ALFARABI

God is only one. For, if there were two gods, they would have to be partly alike and partly different: in which case, however, the simplicity of each would be destroyed. In other words, if there were two gods, there would necessarily have to be some difference and some identity between them; the differential and the common element would constitute the parts of the essence of each one, and these parts, in turn, would be the cause of all; and then, not God, but His parts, would be the first being.

ST. THOMAS

If there be two things, both of which are of necessity, they must needs agree in the intention of the necessity of being. It follows, therefore, that they must be differentiated by something added either to one or to both of them; and consequently that either one is composite, or both. Now no composite exists necessarily per se. Therefore there cannot possibly be several things each of which exists necessarily; and consequently neither can there be several gods. 64





If there was anything equal to God, then He would cease to be the fullness of being, for fullness implies impossibility of finding anything of its kind. For instance, the fullness of power means inability of finding identical power anywhere else; the fullness of beauty means inability of finding identical beauty. Likewise if the first being possesses the fullness of being, this means that it is impossible to find anyone or anything identical with Him. Therefore, there is one infinite being, only one God. 63

God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one, which did not belong to another ... So it is impossible for many gods to exist. 65

God is existence itself. Consequently He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being ... It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. 66





God is one, because He is free from all quantitative divisions. One means undivided. He who is indivisible in substance is one in essence. 67

Since one is an undivided being, if anything is supremely one it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. Hence it is manifest that God is one in the supreme degree. 68



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(B) Process of Pre-eminence

GOD IS INTELLIGENT

ALFARABI

God is intelligent. A thing is intelligent because it exists without matter. Now, God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore, He is intelligent. 69

ST. THOMAS

A thing is intelligent from the fact of its being without matter. Now it was shown above that God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore He is intelligent. 70





God knows Himself perfectly. If there is anything that would keep God from knowing Himself, that would certainly be matter. But God is absolutely immaterial. Hence it follows that He knows Himself fully, because His intellect is His essence.

That which by its nature is severed from matter and from material conditions, is by its very nature intelligible. Now every intelligible is understood according as it is actually one with the intelligent; and God is Himself intelligent, as we have proved. Therefore since He is altogether immaterial, and is absolutely one with Himself, He understands Himself most perfectly.





That which by its essence is intellect in act, is, too, by its very essence intelligible in act. Now, the divine intellect is always intellect in act, because if it were not so, then it would be in potentiality with respect to its object; and this is impossible. Just exactly the opposite occurs in man. The human intellect is not al-ways in act. Man knows himself in act after knowing himself potentially. The reason for this is that man's intellect is not his essence. Hence, what he knows does not belong to him by essence. 71

A thing is actually understood through the unification of the intellect in act and the intelligible in act. Now the divine intellect is always intellect in act ... Since the divine intellect and the divine essence are one, it is evident that God understands Himself perfectly: for God is both His own intellect and His own essence. 72



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GOD KNOWS ALL THINGS THROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF





ALFARABI

It must not be said that God derives His knowledge of things from the things themselves, but rather it must be said that He knows things through His essence. By looking at His essence, He sees everything. Hence, knowing His essence is the cause of His knowing other things. 73

ST. THOMAS

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things, not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself. 74





GOD IS TRUTH

Truth follows being, namely, truth and being coincide. But God is the supreme being. Therefore, He is the supreme truth. Truth is the conformity of the intellect and thing. But in God intellect and object of thought are one and the same. 75

Truth and being are mutually consequent upon one another; since the True is when that is said to be which is, and that not to be, which is not. Now God's being is first and most perfect. Therefore His truth is also first and supreme... Truth is in our intellect through the latter being equated to the thing understood. Now the cause of equality is unity. Since then in the divine intellect, intellect and thing understood are absolutely the same, His truth must be the first and supreme truth. 76





GOD IS LIFE

Just as we call ourselves living beings, because we have a nature capable of sensation or understanding, in like manner God, whose intellect is His essence, must have life in the most perfect degree. 77

Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, must have life in the most perfect degree. 78



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The foregoing is but a summary of Alfarabi's teaching about God and His attributes. My conclusion is that his Theodicy shows a scholarly, closely reasoned work. For, he has given us a carefully worked out treatise on the question of God's existence and His attributes. On the question of God's existence, he improved the Aristotelian proof of the first mover, adding to it two other proofs, that of efficient causes and of contingence. On the other hand, the attributes of God are dealt with so perfectly from the Christian viewpoint that the whole topic seems to have been written by a Christian Father, rather than by a Mohammedan. That Alfarabi's Theodicy exerted a great influence on Medieval thinkers is evident, because, upon comparing the teachings of Alfarabi with those of St. Thomas, we see without doubt the influence of the former on the latter, but not vice versa.

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